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COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS: HOW 
LICENSING CAN SOLVE THE ACADEMIC WORK-FOR-
HIRE DILEMMA 
Glenda A. Gertz 
Abstract: Many copyrightable works of university faculty members may be works-for-
hire as defined under current U.S. copyright laws. Copyrights in works-for-hire are treated 
differently than copyrights in other works with respect to ownership, duration, termination 
rights, and requirements for transfer. Ambiguity over whether a specific faculty-created work 
is a work-for-hire creates legal uncertainties and potential future litigation about the initial 
ownership of the copyright, length of the copyright term, and termination rights which could 
impact all future transfers and licensing. Many universities have attempted to define 
ownership of faculty-created works through university policies. These policies are ineffective 
to alter the presumption of university ownership of works-for-hire, as they do not meet the 
requirements of U.S. copyright laws for a transfer of such ownership. This Comment argues 
that the best way to resolve these ambiguities is for the university to retain ownership of the 
copyrights in faculty-created works and provide the faculty creator with a license to the 
copyrighted work. Although perhaps counterintuitive, this Comment suggests that a licensing 
approach would actually result in greater certainty and better protection of the interests of 
both the faculty member and the university. 
INTRODUCTION 
University faculty members engage in a wide variety of activities, 
including teaching, research, and writing. Some of these activities result 
in the creation of copyrightable materials. As technology has become 
more fully integrated into the university environment, the variety of 
copyrightable faculty-created works has increased.1 In the United States, 
copyright protection is given to “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.”2 In a university setting, original 
works of authorship might include software, websites, data compilations, 
technical manuals, textbooks, articles, visual artworks, fiction and 
non-fiction writings, musical works, video games, and on-line courses, 
which may themselves include a variety of copyrightable components 
such as text, video, sound, and pictures. There has been some debate 
over the past thirty years as to whether the copyrights in such materials 
1. See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work 
in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 267 (2004). 
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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belong to the faculty member who created them or to the university as an 
employer.3 During this time period, it has become common practice for 
universities to take ownership of patents on faculty inventions, and in 
some cases these patents have benefitted the universities financially 
through licensing or other commercialization strategies.4 Some 
commenters of the past decade have speculated that universities may 
attempt to assert ownership over copyrights as well, particularly when 
the materials involved have significant potential commercial value, such 
as distance-learning curricula.5 Many universities have, in fact, adopted 
formal copyright policies that address ownership of faculty-created 
works.6 Despite the commenters’ fears, however, most university 
policies surveyed express a desire for faculty members to own the 
copyrights to “traditional scholarly works.”7 
The question of how to accomplish that stated goal is more difficult 
than it might first appear. Some commenters believe that the copyrights 
in many faculty works, even traditional scholarly works, belong to the 
university as a work-for-hire.8 Whether a work was created as a 
3. See Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University Professors: The Interplay 
Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 223 (1992); 
Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing “Teacher Exception,” or 
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209 (2003); 
Nathaniel S. Strauss, Anything But Academic: How Copyright’s Work-For-Hire Doctrine Affects 
Professors, Graduate Students, and K-12 Teachers in the Information Age, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 
(2011); Robert Ware III, Copyrights, Professors and Public Universities, 16 EDUC. & L.J. 251 
(2007). 
4. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 212–20 (discussing commercialization strategies at 
universities, including commercialization of patents); see also Verdict Form, Carnegie Mellon Univ. 
v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 09-290, 2012 WL 6686094, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2012) 
(awarding the University over $1 billion in a patent infringement case). 
5. See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty 
Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (2002); Ware III, supra note 3. 
6. See Lape, supra note 3 and Packard, supra note 5 for surveys of university copyright policies 
at two different points in time. 
7. See Packard, supra note 5, at 306 (stating that, as of 2002, 71% of universities surveyed 
disclaim ownership of “traditional scholarly work”). The preambles of many university policies 
express general support for faculty ownership of scholarly works. See infra Part II.B (regarding the 
definition of “traditional scholarly works”); see, e.g., University of California Policy on Copyright 
Ownership, http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2100003/CopyrightOwnership (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) 
(“This Policy is intended to embody the spirit of academic tradition, which provides copyright 
ownership to faculty for their scholarly and aesthetic copyrighted works.”); University of 
Washington Patent, Invention, and Copyright Policy, 
http://www.washington.edu/admin/rules/policies/PO/EO36.html (last visited May 6, 2013) (“[T]he 
University acknowledges the right of faculty, staff, and students to prepare and publish, through 
individual initiative, articles, pamphlets, and books that are copyrighted by the authors or their 
publishers.”). 
8. See Alissa Centivany, Paper Tigers: Rethinking the Relationship Between Copyright and 
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work-for-hire has a dramatic impact on the treatment of the work under 
U.S. copyright law. The copyrights in a work-for-hire are presumed to 
belong to the employer rather than the creative employee.9 The duration 
of the copyright in a work-for-hire is different from other works,10 and a 
work-for-hire does not carry termination rights for licenses.11 A 
work-for-hire also has special requirements for transfer of copyrights, 
requiring an express writing signed by both the employer and the 
employee.12 A university copyright policy generally does not bear the 
signature of both parties and is therefore likely inadequate to alter or 
transfer ownership.13 Because the copyrights in some scholarly works 
may belong to the university rather than the faculty member, there is a 
risk that assignments and licenses executed by the faculty member are 
ineffective.14 
This Comment will argue that the best solution to this problem is not 
for universities to disclaim copyrights or assign copyrights to faculty 
members, but rather for universities to retain ownership and provide 
faculty members with licenses to the copyrights in the works that they 
create. By changing their approach from fighting against the 
work-for-hire presumption of employer ownership to one which accepts 
and works within that presumption, universities and faculty members 
will clarify the legal status of copyright ownership, transfers, and 
licenses, and can ensure that the rights in faculty-created works are 
appropriately distributed. 
This Comment begins with a review of the relevant copyright law in 
Part I. This discussion includes the early development of the 
work-for-hire doctrine and the teacher exception, the changes to the law 
as a result of the Copyright Act of 1979, the current trend of applying 
agency law concepts to define terms such as “employee” and “scope of 
employment,” and the statutory requirements for altering copyright 
ownership. Part II discusses the application of copyright law to 
faculty-created works and the impact of university copyright policies. 
Part III describes the problems that exist within the current model of 
Scholarly Publishing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2011); Todd F. Simon, Faculty 
Writings: Are They “Works Made For Hire” Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485 
(1983). 
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2006). 
10. Id. § 302. 
11. Id. § 203. 
12. Id. § 201(b). 
13. See infra Part III.B. 
14. See infra Part II.B. 
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copyright ownership, under which many university copyright policies 
attempt to define ownership of various categories of works. Part IV 
offers an alternative model, under which universities would retain 
copyright ownership of faculty works, but provide faculty members with 
licenses to those works. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE 
AND THE TEACHER EXCEPTION 
A. Early Copyright Law Included a Work-For-Hire Doctrine 
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to pass legislation 
protecting authors’ rights in their works. Article I, Section 8 gives 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”15 In 1790, the first 
U.S. copyright law was enacted.16 The Copyright Act of 1790 gave 
authors copyright protection for “maps, charts and books” for a 
fourteen-year term, along with an additional fourteen years if renewed.17 
Although the Copyright Act of 1790 did not specifically address 
ownership of works created by employees, at least one court recognized 
the existence of a work-for-hire doctrine in 1899.18 In Colliery Engineer 
Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co.,19 the court stated that an 
employer was entitled to copyright the literary products of a salaried 
employee made in the course of his employment and the employee 
“would have no more right than any stranger to copy or reproduce [the 
work].”20 In 1903, the United States Supreme Court cited Colliery 
Engineer in support of the proposition that designs “having been 
produced by persons employed and paid by the [employers] in their 
establishment to make those very things” are owned by the employers.21 
In other words, the employer was considered the “author” of a 
copyrightable work created by an employee hired for the purpose of 
creating such a work. 
Congress revised the copyright laws in 1909, in part to correct 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
16. Copyright Act of 1790. 
17. Id. § I. 
18. Colliery Eng’r Co. v. United Correspondence Schs. Co., 94 F. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 153. 
21. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). 
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inconsistencies that had become apparent over time and in part to 
accommodate new technologies, such as the player piano and the 
phonograph.22 The Copyright Act of 1909 made a number of changes to 
the 1790 Act, including broadening the subject matter that could be 
copyrighted to include “all the writings of an author”23 and doubling the 
length of both the initial term and the renewal term.24 The 1909 Act 
explicitly stated, “the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the 
case of works made for hire.”25 However, the Act did not define either 
“employer” or “works made for hire.”26 
Courts interpreted the “works made for hire” language of the 1909 
Act as being consistent with the prior case law. In Brattleboro 
Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,27 the Second Circuit stated, 
“[t]his so-called ‘works for hire’ doctrine was recognized earlier by the 
Supreme Court . . . and was later codified in the Copyright Act.”28 The 
court went on to describe the work-for-hire doctrine as applying 
“whenever an employee’s work is produced at the instance and expense 
of his employer. In such circumstances, the employer has been presumed 
to have the copyright.”29 The “instance and expense” test continued to 
be used to determine when a copyrightable work fell within the category 
of work-for-hire under the 1909 Act. For example, the writings of a 
religious leader were held not to be works-for-hire because the 
employer, a church founded by the religious leader, was not the 
motivating factor in the creation of the works.30 On the other hand, 
President Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe was held to be a 
work-for-hire because the publisher persuaded President Eisenhower to 
write the book and paid for his support staff and illustrations.31 
22. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:45 (2013).  
23. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976). 
24. Id. at 1080. 
25. Id. at 1087–88. 
26. Id. 
27. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). 
28. Id. at 567. 
29. Id. 
30. See Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322 
(9th Cir. 2000) (considering copyright ownership of works governed by the Copyright Act of 1909). 
31. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(considering copyright ownership of works governed by the Copyright Act of 1909). 
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B. A Teacher Exception Was Established Within the Work-For-Hire 
Doctrine 
Although the “instance and expense” test creates quite a broad 
definition of work-for-hire, a teacher’s non-instructional work at a 
school or university might not fall into this category. In 1929, the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held in Sherrill v. Grieves32 
that a military instructor owned the copyright in a book he wrote 
covering the same subjects that he taught.33 Clarence Sherrill taught at a 
school for army officers.34 On his own time and initiative, Sherrill wrote 
a text on “military sketching, map reading and surveying.”35 He allowed 
the school administration to print a pamphlet for students containing an 
excerpt from his copyrighted but, as yet, unpublished book.36 When 
Sherrill sued a third party for publishing an infringing work, the defense 
argued that the material in the pamphlet could not be copyrighted, as it 
was the property of Sherrill’s employer, the U.S. Government.37 Under 
the Copyright Act of 1909, U.S. Government publications were not to be 
copyrighted, but were to be placed in the public domain.38 Although 
Sherrill’s work was not created at the direct instance or expense of his 
employer, the defendants argued that the work contained the same 
information that Sherrill was employed to teach and, therefore, should be 
considered to be within his duties as an instructor.39 The court rejected 
this argument, stating that “[t]he court does not know of any authority 
holding that such a professor is obliged to reduce his lectures to writing 
or if he does so that they become the property of the institution 
employing him.”40 The court then noted that military officers did write 
books that were both copyrighted and used for instruction in military 
academies.41 This decision, with its reliance on custom and lack of 
judicial precedent, is commonly cited as the origin of the “teacher 
exception” to the work-for-hire doctrine.42 
32. 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929). 
33. Id. at 291.  
34. Id. at 289. 
35. Id. at 290. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 287. 
38. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976); Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. 
Rep. at 290. 
39. Sherrill, 57 Wash. L. Rep. at 290. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 548–49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Strauss, supra note 
 
                                                     
 
14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:16 PM 
2013] COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS 1471 
Very few cases since Sherrill can be cited in support of the teacher 
exception. In the opinion of Judge Posner, as expressed in Hays v. Sony 
Corp. of America,43 this lack of precedent exists because “virtually no 
one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright his 
writings.”44 In addition to Sherrill, the case of Williams v. Weisser45 is 
often used to support the existence of a teacher exception under the 1909 
Copyright Act.46 The issue in Williams was whether a person selling his 
class notes after attending a lecture was infringing a copyright belonging 
to the professor or to the university.47 Because the lecture was not in any 
fixed format, such as written text or recorded sound, it was not protected 
by the federal Copyright Act.48 The only copyright in the lecture was a 
common-law copyright under the laws of the State of California,49 which 
the court held belonged to the professor rather than the university.50 
Although the reasoning used by the court was similar to that used by the 
Sherrill court, including custom, lack of precedent, and “the undesirable 
consequences which would follow from a holding that a university owns 
the copyright to the lectures of its professors,”51 the case did not address 
federal copyright law and therefore has limited precedential value with 
respect to the existence of a federal teacher exception. 
C. The Copyright Act of 1976 Redefined Work-For-Hire Using 
Agency Law Concepts 
In 1976, Congress passed another major revision to the federal 
copyright laws intended, in part, to conform U.S. copyright laws to the 
international copyright provisions of the Berne Convention treaty.52 This 
3, at 12; Ware III, supra note 3, at 256. 
43. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
44. Id. at 416. 
45. 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542. 
46. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 14; Ware III, supra note 3, at 256–57. 
47. See Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 542. 
48. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077–78 (repealed 1976) (stating that 
copyright is secured by affixing the notice of copyright to each copy published or by depositing a 
complete copy of a work with the copyright office, thereby implying that the work must exist in 
some physical, fixed format). Note that the professor’s own written notes, used in preparing the 
lecture, could have been protected by federal copyright. The distinction here is that it was not a copy 
of the professor’s notes which was sold, but rather the notes which were written by the seller upon 
hearing the oral lecture. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
49. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
50. Id. at 550. 
51. Id. at 546. 
52. See PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 1:71 (regarding the history of the 1979 
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revision included language that expanded on the work-for-hire doctrine. 
A “work made for hire” was explicitly defined as: 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary 
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as 
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall 
be considered a work made for hire.53 
For works that fall within the category of “work made for hire,” as 
defined above, “the employer . . . is considered the author . . . and, 
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written 
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the 
copyright.”54 
Despite Congress’s attempt to clarify the work-for-hire doctrine,55 the 
courts were again called upon to define the limits of the doctrine. Three 
distinct interpretations developed in the federal circuit courts, each using 
a different test to decide when a work was created by an employee and 
thus fell into category (1) of the definition.56 The United States Supreme 
Court addressed this confusion with its decision in Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.57 Reid involved a dispute over ownership 
of the copyright in a statue commissioned by a non-profit group.58 The 
dispositive question in Reid was whether the sculptor was an employee 
of the non-profit group.59 As the only decision to date in which the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the work-for-hire provisions of the 1976 
statute, Reid has been the subject of many commentaries.60 The relevant 
Copyright Act); id. § 1:89 (regarding the legislative history of the Berne Implementation Act of 
1988). 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
54. Id. § 201(b). 
55. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 227–34 (discussing the legislative history of the Copyright 
Act of 1976). 
56. See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1989) (using whether one 
party was a formal, salaried employee of the other); Easter Seal Soc’y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 
323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (using the rules of agency law); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 
738 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1984) (using the instance and expense test developed prior to 1976).  
57. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
58. Id. at 733. 
59. Id. at 738. 
60. See Katherine B. Marik, Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: New Certainty for 
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point for purposes of this Comment is that the Court used the general 
common law of agency to interpret the term “employee” as used in 
§ 101.61 Because the Court held that Mr. Reid was not an employee as 
defined by agency law,62 the question of whether the work was made 
within the scope of his employment did not arise in this case. It has been 
suggested, however, that it would be consistent to apply agency law to 
the interpretation of scope of employment as well,63 especially 
considering that, as noted by the Fifth Circuit, “‘scope of employment’ 
is virtually a term of art in agency law.”64 
D. The Teacher Exception Did Not Survive the 1976 Revision of 
Copyright Law 
The Copyright Act of 1976 was noticeably silent with respect to the 
teacher exception. One commenter who reviewed the history of the 
teacher exception in 2003 included an extensive discussion of the 
legislative history of the 1976 Act.65 That commenter observed that the 
teacher exception was never mentioned during the drafting of or debate 
regarding the 1976 Act.66 A number of commenters have argued that the 
1976 Act abolished the judicially created teacher exception.67 
Since 1976, courts have had few opportunities to consider the 
existence of a teacher exception. Two cases, Weinstein v. University of 
Illinois68 and Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,69 regarding faculty 
copyright ownership arose in the Seventh Circuit in the 1980s, but 
neither case was decided on the basis of a judicially created teacher 
exception due to the precise questions on appeal.70 In Weinstein, one of 
the Copyright Work for Hire Doctrine, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 589 (1991); Nancy Barbara Morris, 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Incomplete Resolution of the Work for Hire 
Controversy, 11 PACE L. REV. 167 (1990); Jennifer Sutherland Lubinski, Comment, The Work for 
Hire Doctrine Under Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Artist’s Fair Weather 
Friend, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 119 (1996). 
61. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750–51. 
62. Id. at 752. 
63. See infra Part II.A. 
64. Easter Seal Soc’y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987). 
65. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 227–34. 
66. Id. at 234. 
67. See Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic’s Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 17 (1984); Simon, supra note 8. 
68. 811 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987). 
69. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 
70. Weinstein, 811 F.2d 1091; Hays, 847 F.2d 412. 
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several authors of a scholarly article sued his university when the names 
of the authors were re-ordered prior to publication.71 In deciding 
ownership of the copyright in the article, the Seventh Circuit considered 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the University’s internal copyright policy, 
and the existence of academic traditions supporting faculty ownership of 
copyrights, but it did not explicitly name or rely on the teacher exception 
doctrine.72 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion argues that the copyright 
belonged to the authors,73 but as the outcome of the case would have 
been the same whether the article was a work-for-hire or not, this 
argument is dicta.74 
Shortly after the Weinstein case was decided, the Seventh Circuit 
heard Hays.75 This case concerned copyright ownership of a 
word-processing manual produced by high school teachers.76 The 
plaintiffs originally sued under common-law copyright, which was 
abolished by the Copyright Act of 1976, and therefore inapplicable to 
the work in question.77 The lower court dismissed the case for failure to 
state a claim and sanctioned the plaintiffs’ attorney for his conduct in 
pursuing the suit.78 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sanctions, 
which were primarily based on failure to pursue the suit effectively.79 
Despite the fact that the sanctions were not dependent on whether the 
complaint was frivolous,80 the court considered in dicta whether there 
might have been a genuine claim for infringement of statutory copyright, 
even if there was no valid common-law claim.81 The answer to that 
question hinged on whether the teachers owned the copyright in the 
work, or if it was owned by the school district as a work-for-hire.82 In 
his opinion, Judge Posner conducted a thorough review of the work-for-
hire doctrine and included policy arguments in support of a teacher 
exception, but stated that “it is widely believed that the 1976 Act 
71. 811 F.2d at 1092–93. 
72. Id. at 1094–96. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1095. 
75. 847 F.2d 412. 
76. Id. at 413. 
77. Id. at 415. 
78. Id. at 413. 
79. Id. at 417–19. 
80. Id. at 417. 
81. Id. at 416. 
82. Id. 
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abolished the teacher exception.”83 
One of the most thorough recent analyses of the teacher exception is 
given in Molinelli-Freytes v. University of Puerto Rico (Molinelli-
Freytes I).84 In this case, the plaintiffs were professors at the University 
of Puerto Rico who developed a proposal for a new graduate program.85 
By the time the University approved and began to implement the 
proposal, the parties appeared to have had a falling out, resulting in the 
plaintiffs’ suit against the University for copyright infringement over 
unauthorized use of the proposal manuscript.86 The plaintiffs filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction, basing their argument on the 
existence of a teacher exception to the work-for-hire doctrine.87 The 
question of whether a teacher exception exists was therefore squarely 
before the court. Judge Dominguez’s opinion provided a thorough 
review of the history and policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the 
teacher exception.88 On the basis of Congress’s silence with respect to 
the teacher exception in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 
1976, the apparent abandonment of the teacher exception by courts 
following the 1976 Act, and the Supreme Court’s application of agency 
law in Reid, the court held that the teacher exception no longer exists.89 
II. THE WORK-FOR-HIRE STATUS OF FACULTY-CREATED 
WORKS AND THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT 
POLICIES 
A. Some Faculty-Created Works Fall Within the Faculty Member’s 
Scope of Employment 
If the teacher exception has, in fact, been abolished, then the critical 
question for ownership of faculty-created works becomes whether the 
creation of the copyrighted work was within the faculty member’s scope 
83. Id. 
84. 792 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.P.R. 2010); see also Pittsburg State Univ./Kan. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. 
Kan. Bd. of Regents/Pittsburg State Univ., 122 P.3d 336, 345–47 (Kan. 2005) (holding that faculty 
works are not automatically works-for-hire merely because the faculty are employees, nor are 
faculty works automatically subject to a teacher exception, but that the principles of agency law 
must be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine the work-for-hire status of a faculty work). 
85. Molinelli-Freytes I, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 164.  
86. Id. at 165. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 166–72. 
89. Id. 
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of employment.90 Works created by faculty members within the scope of 
their employment would belong to the university as works-for-hire.91 
Courts have applied the agency law definition of “scope of employment” 
in the context of copyrighted computer software,92 thus extending the 
Supreme Court’s use of agency law in Reid.93 The Second Circuit 
applied the same reasoning to the academic world in Shaul v. Cherry 
Valley-Springfield Central School District,94 which concerned the 
copyright ownership of tests and homework problems created by a high 
school teacher.95 The court in Shaul considered the elements of “scope 
of employment” found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency:96 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, 
but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and 
space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
master. . . .97 
The court found that Shaul’s teaching materials met all three elements, 
despite the fact that they were written at least partly outside the regular 
school day, stating that: 
It is clear that preparing materials for class was the kind of work 
that he was employed to perform as a teacher (satisfying the first 
prong) and that Shaul was motivated to spend the time to 
prepare materials for class in order to fulfill his duties as a 
teacher (satisfying the third prong), regardless of his purported 
desire to publish the materials. With respect to the second 
prong, . . . the very nature of a teacher’s duties involves a 
substantial amount of time outside of class devoted to preparing 
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
91. See id. 
92. See, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992) (using the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency to determine that a software program written by an employee on his own time, 
but for the purpose of allowing him to perform his job duties more efficiently and with fewer errors, 
was a work-for-hire); Roeslin v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995) (using the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine that a software program written by an employee on 
his own time for the purpose of creating job opportunities for himself and simply to prove that it 
could be done was not a work-for-hire). 
93. See supra Part I.C. 
94. Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004). 
95. Id. at 184. 
96. Id. at 186. 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). 
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lessons, problem sets, and quizzes and tests — which is clearly 
within the scope of his employment.98 
The court declined to express an opinion on the existence of a teacher 
exception, stating that the academic tradition cited to support a teacher 
exception in cases like Weinstein99 does not include “teaching materials 
that were never explicitly prepared for publication.”100 
Determining the kinds of work that fall within a faculty member’s 
scope of employment was also a crucial question in a second opinion in 
the Molinelli-Freytes case (Molinelli-Freytes II).101 The 
Molinelli-Freytes I opinion discussed above dealt only with the 
plaintiffs’ argument for a teacher exception.102 Following the finding 
that no such exception exists, the University of Puerto Rico moved for 
summary judgment on the basis that the University owned the copyright 
in the proposal.103 The University argued that creation of the proposal 
was within the plaintiffs’ scope of employment and the proposal was 
therefore a work-for-hire.104 In an unpublished opinion, Magistrate 
Judge McGiverin considered each of the relevant elements of agency 
law.105 First, the court found that the graduate program proposal was the 
kind of work plaintiffs were employed to perform, on the basis of 
plaintiffs’ status as University employees, their job descriptions, and an 
assessment of the regular duties of University faculty.106 Second, the 
court found that the work was created within the authorized time and 
space, even though plaintiffs had done much of the work at home, 
because the University gave faculty the flexibility to work at home, and 
on evenings and weekends, in the performance of their jobs.107 Finally, 
the court found that plaintiffs were motivated by a desire to further the 
interests of the university in the creation of the proposal, as they 
“designed it with the intent of submitting it to the . . . approval process, 
and . . . actually did so.”108 Having found all three elements satisfied, the 
98. Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186. 
99. 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987). 
100. Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186. 
101. See Molinelli-Freytes v. Univ. of P.R. (Molinelli-Freytes II), Civil No. 09-1655 
(DRD/BJM), 2012 WL 4665638, *11–13 (D.P.R. Feb. 15, 2012). 
102. Molinelli-Freytes I, 792 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.P.R. 2010); see supra Part I.D. 
103. Molinelli-Freytes II, 2012 WL 4665638, at *1. 
104. Id. at *11. 
105. Id. at *12. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at *13. 
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court held that the proposal was, in fact, written within the scope of 
plaintiffs’ employment.109 
B. Universities Have Attempted to Define Copyright Ownership 
Through the Use of Internal Copyright Policies 
In an effort to address the uncertainty regarding whether a teacher 
exception survived following the Copyright Act of 1976, an increasing 
number of universities have adopted institutional policies regarding 
copyright ownership.110 Two prior studies have surveyed university 
policies. In 1992, Laura Lape surveyed the seventy universities 
classified as “Research Universities I” by the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching.111 In 2002, Ashley Packard surveyed the 
copyright policies of the same seventy universities.112 The Carnegie 
Foundation updates its classifications every five years, and the most 
recent version uses “Research Universities – Very High Research 
Activity” as the equivalent class to the one used in the 1992 survey.113 
This class contains 108 universities, the copyright policies of which 
were surveyed for the present Comment.114 These policies appear to take 
one of two basic approaches.115 The first approach, used by 
approximately one-third of the policies, is to generally claim ownership 
of faculty works, with exceptions for specific kinds of works in which 
university ownership is disclaimed.116 The second approach, used by 
109. Id. 
110. See Lape, supra note 3, at 252 (surveying the copyright policies of large research 
universities and finding that fifty-four out of seventy universities surveyed had such a policy in 
place); Packard, supra note 5, at 294 (surveying the same universities and finding that sixty-six had 
such a policy in place ten years after the initial survey).  
111. See Lape, supra note 3, at 252. 
112. See Packard, supra note 5, at 294. 
113. See Carnegie Foundation, Classification Descriptions, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/descriptions/ (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2013) for a description of the classifications used for the Foundation’s 2010 
classification. 
114. See Carnegie Foundation, Basic Classification Descriptions, CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/descriptions/basic.php 
(follow “RU/VH” hyperlink) for a list of universities in the Very High Research Activity class as of 
the Foundation’s 2010 classification. A compilation of the university copyright policies reviewed 
for this Comment is available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/featuredarticles/ 
dec13.aspx. 
115. These are very broad categories and while the distinction is clear for some policies, others 
are more difficult to categorize. The statistics that follow are based on this author’s interpretation of 
the policy language.  
116. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Cal., University of Southern California Intellectual Property Policy 
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approximately two-thirds of the policies, is to generally disclaim 
ownership of faculty works, with exceptions for specific kinds of works 
in which university ownership is claimed.117 
Both groups of policies typically disclaim ownership of “traditional 
scholarly works,” which is variously defined, but generally includes 
textbooks, popular or scholarly non-fiction, novels, poems, musical 
works, dramatic works, and works of art.118 Some policies include a 
statement explaining the university’s motivation in disclaiming these 
works. The reasons given commonly include academic tradition, 
preservation of faculty members’ academic freedom, and a desire to 
encourage production and dissemination of scholarly works.119 
Most policies of both kinds typically claim ownership of works 
created by employees specifically assigned to create such works and 
works created with significant or unusual use of university resources.120 
§ 2.1 (Apr. 3, 2001), available at http://policies.usc.edu/p4acad_stud/intellectual_property.pdf; N.Y. 
Univ., Statement of Policy on Intellectual Property §§ XI.A(1), XI.B (July 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/IPPolicyFINAL.pdf. 
117. See, e.g., Brandeis Univ., Intellectual Property Policy § III.A. (Feb. 2004), available at 
http://www.brandeis.edu/ora/policies/intelproppolicy.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013); Brown Univ., 
Brown University Patent and Invention Policy and Copyright Policy § 2.2 (May 27, 2005), 
available at http://research.brown.edu/pdf/newpatent%20policy.pdf. 
118. See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Policy (Nov. 2, 2002): Copyrights 
§ IV.C. (rev. Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.cfo.pitt.edu/policies/policy/11/11-02-02.pdf 
(defining “Scholarly Works” as “courseware, popular nonfiction, novels, textbooks, poems, musical 
compositions, films, webpages, lecture notes, dramatic works or other works of artistic 
imagination”); Univ. of Minn., Board of Regents Policy: Copyright § II.4 (Dec. 14, 2007), available 
at http://regents.umn.edu/sites/default/files/policies/Copyright.pdf (defining “Academic Work” as 
“a scholarly, pedagogical, or creative work, such as an article, book, textbook, novel, work of visual 
art, dramatic work, musical composition, course syllabus, test, or class notes”). 
119. See, e.g., Columbia Univ., Preamble to the Columbia University Copyright Policy (June 3, 
2000), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/provost/docs/copyright.html (“Faculty at the 
University must be free to choose and pursue areas of study and concentration without interference, 
to share the results of their intellectual efforts with colleagues and students, to use and disseminate 
their own creations, and to take their created works with them should they leave the University.”); 
Dartmouth Coll., Copyright Ownership Policy (Sept. 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~osp/resources/policies/dartmouth/copyright.html (“As a matter of 
fundamental principle, however, the College encourages wide dissemination of scholarly work 
produced by members of the Dartmouth community, including copyrightable works.”); N.D. State 
Univ., Policy Manual: Section 190 (rev. Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.ndsu.edu/fileadmin/policy/190.pdf (“The primary purposes of this policy are to 
encourage and promote research and scholarship based on the traditional principles of the academic 
profession.”). 
120. See, e.g., Univ. of Va., Policy: Ownership Rights in Copyrightable Material (Apr. 1, 2004), 
available at https://policy.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=%27RES-001 (defining 
“significant” use of university resources as “substantial and dedicated use of University equipment, 
facilities, or personnel”); Univ. of Notre Dame, Intellectual Property Policy at the University of 
Notre Dame (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://policy.nd.edu/policy_files/IntellectualProperty 
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These provisions often explicitly reference the work-for-hire provisions 
of copyright law and some use specific assignment, significant use of 
university resources, or other similar factors to identify works that fall 
within the scope of employment.121 
Two leading treatises on copyright law, Nimmer on Copyright and 
Abrams on Copyright, argue that these policies are not effective to alter 
copyright ownership of a work-for-hire.122 Under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), 
the initial authorship of a work-for-hire may be changed, but an express 
written agreement signed by both parties is required.123 Nimmer points 
out three cases that suggest that a university copyright policy does not 
meet the § 201(b) requirement.124 In the first case, Manning v. Board of 
Trustees of Community College District No. 505,125 a university staff 
photographer argued that he owned the copyright in his photographs, 
which were works-for-hire.126 The court found that a collective 
bargaining agreement that included a policy statement asserting that 
Policy.pdf (defining substantial use of university resources as “the utilization of University 
facilities, equipment, personnel (including graduate students), or other resources beyond that which 
is normally provided to carry out one’s assigned duties”); Univ. of Ill., Article III: Intellectual 
Property § 4(a)(2) (Sept. 3, 1998), available at http://www.trustees.uillinois.edu/trustees/ 
agenda/September-10-2009/009-sep-General-Rules-att.pdf (claiming ownership of “[w]orks created 
as a specific requirement of employment or as an assigned University duty”); Or. State Bd. of 
Higher Education, Licensing, Patent, Educational, and Professional Materials Development and 
Copyright Policies and Procedures § 6.215(2) (Oct. 1998), available at 
http://www.ous.edu/sites/default/files/about/polipro/files/IMD_2013-01.pdf (claiming ownership of 
materials “when the individual was employed for the specific purpose of preparing or producing the 
material, or was specifically directed to develop the material as part of general employment duties 
and responsibilities”). 
121. See, e.g., Yale Univ., Yale University Copyright Policy § 2 (Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/ocr/pfg/policies/copyright.html (“Under the Copyright Law, the copyright to a 
work created by a person in the course of his or her employment belongs to the employer rather than 
to the individual creator. The law provides, therefore, that works created by faculty members in the 
course of . . . their jobs, are the property of the University.” The policy then specifies works that fall 
into the course of employment, including assigned tasks, and when the University has committed 
substantial resources to the work.); Univ. of S.C., Intellectual Property Policy § IV.A. (rev. Apr. 26, 
2005), available at http://www.sc.edu/policies/acaf133.html (“It is the policy of the University that 
all rights in copyright shall remain with the creator unless the work (a) is a work-for-hire (and 
copyright vests in the University under copyright law), (b) is supported by a direct allocation of 
funds through the University for the pursuit of a specific project, (c) is commissioned by the 
University, or (d) is otherwise subject to contractual obligations.”). 
122. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[D] (2013) 
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 4.26 
(2012). 
123. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
124. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 122, § 5.03[D]. 
125. 109 F. Supp. 2d 976 (C.D. Ill. 2000). 
126. Id. at 978. 
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copyrights were owned by staff members did not satisfy the § 201(b) 
requirement for an express writing signed by both parties.127 The second 
case, Rouse v. Walter & Associates, L.L.C.,128 concerns the copyright in 
a software program designed to rate beef cattle that was written, in part, 
by University of Iowa professors.129 The Rouse court found that the 
plaintiffs were university employees who created the software as a 
work-for-hire, and that a university copyright policy contained in a 
faculty handbook did not satisfy the § 201(b) requirements to alter 
ownership.130 The final case discussed is Foraste v. Brown University,131 
another university photographer copyright suit.132 As in Manning, the 
court found that the photographs in question were works-for-hire and 
that the University’s copyright policy did not alter copyright ownership, 
as it did not meet the § 201(b) requirements.133 
Interestingly, the plaintiff in Foraste made an alternative argument 
that even if the photographs were works-for-hire and the copyrights 
originally vested in the university, the university’s copyright policy 
operated to transfer the copyright back to the employee who created the 
work.134 For works that are not works-for-hire, the 1976 Act allows the 
copyright to be transferred to another party with a written instrument 
signed only by the transferor,135 rather than by both parties, as required 
for works-for-hire. The court was not persuaded by this argument, 
however, and found that an employer’s transfer of a work-for-hire to the 
employee must comply with the § 201(b) requirements.136 Allowing a 
work-for-hire owned by the University to be transferred to the employee 
under the general provisions of the Copyright Act would, according to 
the Foraste court, circumvent the work-for-hire provision and be 
contrary to the statutory text’s plain meaning.137 
127. Id. at 981. 
128. 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
129. Id. at 1045–46.  
130. Id. at 1062–64. 
131. 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.R.I. 2003). 
132. Id. at 73. 
133. Id. at 81. 
134. Id. at 74 (The court quotes the University’s copyright policy as stating, in part: “It is the 
University’s position that, as a general premise, ownership of copyrightable property which results 
from performance of one’s University duties and activities will belong to the author or originator.”). 
135. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006). 
136. Foraste, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 81. 
137. Id. 
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III. THE CURRENT MODEL FOR FACULTY COPYRIGHT 
OWNERSHIP CREATES LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES 
As discussed in Part II, the existence of a teacher exception is now 
seriously in doubt, and the work-for-hire status of a particular work is a 
question of law independent of the parties’ traditional understanding. 
This creates problems for the current model for ownership of 
faculty-created works, which relies on either the existence of a teacher 
exception or the parties’ ability to define what constitutes a work-for-
hire. This Part will argue that the ownership of faculty-created works is 
ambiguous under the current model, and will discuss the possible 
repercussions of that ambiguity. 
A. Work-For-Hire Status is Determined Using a Complex, 
Multi-Factor Test 
The Copyright Act’s work-for-hire provisions contain terms that are 
interpreted under the rules of agency law, as seen in Reid and Shaul.138 
The factors that a court considers when determining whether creation of 
any given copyrightable work is within an individual’s scope of 
employment are particularly difficult to apply in the context of faculty 
works.139 When considering whether a university faculty member’s work 
falls within the scope of his or her employment, a court would need to 
decide if: (1) it is the kind of work the faculty member was employed to 
perform, (2) the work occurs substantially within the employer’s 
authorized time and space limits, and (3) the work was motivated 
partially by a desire to further the interests of the university.140 
None of these elements fall decisively one way or the other with 
regard to traditional scholarly works, such as textbooks and journal 
articles. With respect to the first element, some commenters have argued 
that production of scholarly works is not the kind of work that faculty 
members are employed to perform because the university typically does 
not assign a specific faculty member to write a specific article on a 
specific topic.141 Others, however, have argued that the production of 
scholarly works is expected of all faculty members and is one of the 
138. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742–43 (1989); Shaul v. Cherry 
Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004). 
139. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 590, 602 (1987). 
140. See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).  
141. See Scully, supra note 1, at 253; Townsend, supra note 3, at 240–41. 
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criteria on which faculty performance is judged, suggesting that it is the 
kind of work they are employed to perform.142 The second element is 
equally problematic. When universities permit their faculty members to 
have flexible working hours and locations, the time and space element 
alone cannot be used to categorize works as within or outside the scope 
of employment.143 The third element, motivation, is fundamentally 
subjective. It seems likely that most scholarly works are motivated by a 
combination of factors, possibly including the desire to promote one’s 
own career, the desire to promote the reputation of the university or 
department, and the desire to contribute to the advance of thought in the 
field. Agency law requires only that the motivation be in part to benefit 
the employer,144 which could be plausibly argued in almost any faculty 
works context. 
The elements of scope of employment are sufficiently complex to 
make it difficult to predict the outcome for any given scholarly work by 
a faculty member. The status of any given work as a work-for-hire is 
unclear, leaving the question of whether the copyright in the work 
belongs to the faculty member or the university unresolved. 
B. University Copyright Policies That Disclaim Ownership Are Not 
Effective 
University copyright policies typically disclaim ownership of 
traditional scholarly works.145 The assumption appears to be that if the 
university disclaims ownership, ownership will somehow “revert” to the 
faculty member.146 If the work in question is a work-for-hire, however, 
this disclaimer does not satisfy the Copyright Act’s requirement for an 
express writing signed by both parties.147 University copyright policies 
are broad statements of policy and procedure and do not adequately 
define the works to be transferred, nor are they generally signed by 
individual faculty members.148 Reliance on a copyright policy alone, 
therefore, will not settle copyright ownership issues satisfactorily. 
142. See Simon, supra note 8, at 501–09; Strauss, supra note 3, at 45. 
143. See Shaul, 363 F.3d at 186; Molinelli-Freytes II, No. 09-1655, 2012 WL 4665638, at *12 
(D.P.R. Feb. 15, 2012).  
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). 
145. See supra Part II.B. 
146. See supra Part II.B. 
147. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006); see supra Part II.B. 
148. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 405–08. 
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C. The Express Writing Requirement of Section 201(b) Provides No 
Equitable Protection for Faculty Members 
The requirement for an express, signed writing to transfer copyright 
ownership has been likened to the signed writing requirement of the 
statute of frauds.149 For those types of contracts that fall under the statute 
of frauds, a writing must reasonably identify the subject matter, indicate 
that the parties have reached agreement, and state the essential terms of 
the agreement with reasonable certainty.150 In the work-for-hire context, 
§ 201(b) requires an express writing signed by both parties, which 
ensures that both parties understand who will own the completed 
work.151 As with the statute of frauds, no equitable defenses are 
available to parties who allege the existence of an oral or implied 
contract.152 Some commenters have argued that university copyright 
policies, even if not legally effective to transfer copyright ownership, 
estop the university from asserting ownership against the faculty 
member.153 This line of reasoning fails to consider that estoppel is a 
form of equitable defense and, as such, is not available in disputes over 
ownership of copyrights.154 Therefore, in the absence of an express, 
signed writing, there can be no transfer of copyright ownership. 
D. The Duration of a Copyright Is Dependent on the Work’s Status as 
a Work-For-Hire 
Understanding whether a given work falls within the work-for-hire 
category is important for more than just deciding ownership. 
Work-for-hire status also determines the duration of the copyrights and 
whether licenses are subject to termination.155 Copyrights in works that 
were not created as works-for-hire last for the life of the author plus 
seventy years.156 For works-for-hire, the copyrights last for either 120 
years from the creation of the work or ninety-five years from the first 
publication of the work, whichever is shorter.157 Although in many cases 
149. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1981). 
151. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
152. See Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 936–37.  
153. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 411. 
154. See Pamfiloff, 794 F. Supp. at 937; Neva, Inc. v. Christian Duplications Int’l, Inc., 743 F. 
Supp. 1533, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1990). 
155. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 302. 
156. Id. § 302(a). 
157. Id. § 302(c).  
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the value of faculty-created works is weighted toward the present, there 
are some works that will continue to be cited and reproduced for many 
years.158 If there is no consensus on whether the work was originally a 
work-for-hire or not, it will create uncertainty and potential litigation in 
the future over the length of the copyright term. 
Further ambiguity is introduced by the question of termination. 
Licenses in works that were not originally created as works-for-hire may 
be terminated by the copyright holder anytime during the five years 
following the thirty-fifth year of the copyright.159 This termination right 
is owned by the author’s spouse, children, or grandchildren if the author 
dies.160 Licenses in works-for-hire are not subject to termination.161 This 
distinction could be significant for licensees of scholarly works, such as 
textbook publishers. The length of the copyright term and the existence 
of a termination right are likely to be significant issues in negotiating the 
terms under which the copyrights are licensed. Knowing with confidence 
whether a given work is a work-for-hire is therefore important to both 
licensees and licensors. 
E. University Policies That Decide Ownership by Genre of Work May 
Be Ambiguous or Controversial 
Many university copyright policies provide lists of the kinds of works 
the university claims ownership of and the kinds of works that they 
intend to belong to faculty members.162 These lists tend to divide works 
between the two categories by genre. For example, copyrightable 
software is usually claimed for the university, while textbooks are 
usually disclaimed by the university.163 If the ownership of the work is a 
158. Textbooks tend to require frequent updating while works of a more literary or artistic nature 
may have a longer lifespan. For example, James Watson, the Nobel Prize-winning biologist, wrote a 
textbook in 1965 entitled Molecular Biology of the Gene. Although still in use, the textbook is 
currently in its seventh edition and now carries the names of five additional authors. In contrast, 
Watson’s popular account of the events leading to the discovery of DNA’s molecular structure, The 
Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA, was written in 1968 
and is still available in essentially its original form. Both works were created while Watson was a 
member of the Harvard University faculty and, if they had been created after the passage of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, would be subject to the kind of copyright ambiguities discussed by this 
Comment. 
159. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). 
160. Id. § 203(a)(2). 
161. Id. § 203(a). 
162. A compilation of the university copyright policies reviewed for this Comment is available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/issues/featuredarticles/dec13.aspx. 
163. See Georgetown Univ., Faculty Handbook: Intellectual Property § I (rev. May 4, 2006), 
available at http://www1.georgetown.edu/facultyhandbook/toc/section4/sub2/; Univ. of Mich., 
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binary decision, either going solely to the university or solely to the 
faculty member, then the decision to place a given genre in one category 
or the other will determine ownership of all the rights in all works within 
that genre. This could make writing and enforcing such a policy 
controversial within the university community, particularly as hybrid or 
completely new forms of faculty works—such as those used in distance 
learning applications—are developed. 
Problems may also arise when works do not fit neatly into one of the 
listed categories. This seems most likely to happen when new forms of 
works are developed which may not have been provided for in an 
existing copyright policy. For example, when distance-learning curricula 
were first developed at universities, which policy category the new 
curricula fell into was often unclear.164 Some university policies include 
dispute-resolution processes, generally providing for adjudication by 
university representatives.165 Resolving a complex, hard-fought dispute 
could therefore constitute a drain on university resources and a 
distraction to faculty and administrators. 
F. Copyright Ownership May Be Governed by Multiple University 
Policies 
Copyright ownership of works created by faculty members is usually 
addressed in a university’s copyright policy, but other university policies 
may also impact copyright ownership. Universities often have ethics 
rules, conflict of interest policies, and outside activities policies that bear 
on ownership of faculty-created works.166 In one situation where 
ownership of certain teaching materials was in dispute, it was reported 
that the university amended its employment policies to prohibit faculty 
Standard Practice Guide No. 601.28 § B (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/files/services/copyright/601.28%20%281%29.pdf. 
164. See Michael W. Klein, “The Equitable Rule”: Copyright Ownership of Distance-Education 
Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 143, 150 (2004). 
165. See, e.g., Ariz. Bd. of Regents, Policy No. 6-908: Intellectual Property Policy § D.5. (rev. 
Aug. 2010), available at https://azregents.asu.edu/rrc/Policy%20Manual/6-908-
Intellectual%20Property%20Policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); Harvard Univ., Statement of 
Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property § VI (rev. Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://otd.harvard.edu/resources/policies/IP/IPPolicy.pdf. 
166. See, e.g., Purdue Univ., Ethics Policy § III.B.1: Conflicts of Commitment and Reportable 
Outside Activities (rev. Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.purdue.edu/policies/ethics/iiib1.html; Ind. Univ., Policy on Conflicts of Commitment 
Involving Outside Professional Activities (Nov. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~ufc/docs/policies/ConflictsCommitment.pdf (policies specifying limits on 
time spent, income received, and type of activities which may constitute a potential conflict of 
commitment and require reporting to the administration). 
 
                                                     
14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:16 PM 
2013] COPYRIGHTS IN FACULTY-CREATED WORKS 1487 
from engaging in some kinds of outside activities rather than address the 
issue over ownership of the works directly.167 Requiring faculty and 
administrators to refer to multiple policies in order to determine the 
copyright status of a faculty-created work creates additional potential for 
confusion in an already ambiguous situation. 
G. Current Policies May Require Onerous Paperwork to Be 
Enforceable 
Although a blanket university policy does not satisfy the § 201(b) 
requirement for an express writing signed by both parties, it is certainly 
possible for universities and faculty members to create such a writing to 
alter the ownership of works-for-hire. The amount of paperwork 
required to do this on a routine basis, however, may be a significant 
burden. In order to comply with the requirements of § 201(b), the 
university would need to execute a contract with each faculty member 
describing the works to be owned by the faculty member.168 Further, the 
federal copyright statute has been interpreted to require that an 
agreement altering copyright ownership of a work-for-hire must be made 
before the work is completed.169 This prevents universities and faculty 
members from altering the presumption of employer copyright 
ownership retrospectively. Any transfer of copyrights in works already 
completed would require an additional contract between the university 
and the faculty member, adding unnecessary complexity to the situation. 
In many cases, faculty members, believing that they own the 
copyrights in their works, have executed agreements assigning those 
copyrights to publishers.170 In the event that the work in question was 
actually a work-for-hire, the copyright never belonged to the faculty 
167. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 7; Townsend, supra note 3, at 218–19. 
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006). 
169. There is currently a circuit split on whether the agreement must also be in writing before the 
work is completed, or if an oral agreement that is put into writing after completion of the work is 
effective. The Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have disallowed after-completion agreements. See 
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1992); Gladwell Gov’t 
Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Marin, 265 F. App’x 624, 625–26 (9th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit and 
district courts in Alaska, Texas, and Puerto Rico have allowed after-completion agreements that 
confirm an earlier oral agreement. See Campinha-Bacote v. Rearden, No. 3:10-cv-00139-JDR, 2011 
WL 1343343, at *3 (D. Alaska Apr. 8, 2011); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 558–59 
(2d Cir. 1995); TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 196, 206–07 (D.P.R. 2004); 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 839, 842–44 (S.D. Tex. 2001); 
Zyware, Inc. v. Middlegate, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 2348 (SHS), 1997 WL 685336, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
4, 1997). 
170. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 387. 
 
                                                     
14 - Gertz Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2013  2:16 PM 
1488 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1465 
member, making the assignment ineffective.171 The large number of 
textbooks and other works that have been assigned to publishers by 
faculty members over the years means that casting doubt on the legal 
status of these works would create a tremendous disruption. Publishers 
would likely have to contract with the university to resolve this situation, 
creating an additional strain on university resources as these contracts 
are negotiated and executed. 
IV. LICENSING WORKS-FOR-HIRE TO FACULTY MEMBERS 
PROVIDES GREATER CERTAINTY 
Because there is significant ambiguity in the work-for-hire status of 
faculty-created works under the current model, there is also significant 
risk that, in the event of a dispute, the ownership of these works would 
not be resolved consistently with the parties’ intent. As discussed in Part 
III.B, universities’ attempts to resolve this problem using copyright 
policies are probably inadequate. This Part argues that universities and 
faculty members can accomplish their goals with respect to control of 
copyrighted works without ambiguities by using a licensing model rather 
than an assignment model. 
A. Universities Should Retain Ownership of Copyrights in Faculty-
Created Works 
When universities attempt to give ownership of works-for-hire to 
faculty members, they are fighting against the presumption of employer 
ownership in the Copyright Act.172 As a result, the process required to 
transfer ownership is burdensome and the result is often unclear.173 
Recent case law reflects a trend toward abolishing the teacher exception 
and finding that many faculty works belong to the university as 
works-for-hire.174 It is time for universities and faculty to move to a new 
model of copyright ownership that takes these legal realities into 
account. The first step is for universities to include the creation of 
traditional scholarly works within the scope of employment for faculty 
members. Although university policies cannot remove works from the 
work-for-hire category, as that determination is a matter of law,175 
171. See supra Part II.B. 
172. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
173. See supra Part III. 
174. See supra Part II.A, Part I.D. 
175. See PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 22, § 5:47. 
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university policies and employment contracts can broaden the scope of a 
faculty member’s employment, thus including additional works within 
the works-for-hire category. This would allow all faculty-created works 
to begin in the same, well-defined legal category.176 Universities should 
then accept ownership of copyrights for all faculty-created works. 
Although seemingly counter to the parties’ intent, university ownership 
will provide a clear, legally grounded starting point for all further 
licensing and assignment of rights. This will, in turn, allow the parties to 
create effective, enforceable agreements that allocate the copyrights in 
scholarly works in an appropriate manner. 
B. Universities Should License Copyrights to the Faculty Member 
It appears from university copyright policies that universities want to 
provide faculty members with the copyrights to their traditional 
scholarly works.177 The simplest way to accomplish this goal is for the 
university to provide the faculty member with an exclusive license to the 
copyrights in his or her work.178 A licensing approach avoids many of 
the problems that are present in a scheme dependent on university policy 
statements. Because licensing does not invoke the requirement of 
§ 201(b) for the signatures of both parties, it is much easier to write and 
execute an effective license than to attempt to transfer ownership. 
Licensing contracts are subject to the statute of frauds, if such a 
provision exists in the relevant state law, but only to the same extent as 
any other contract not to be performed within one year.179 Courts may 
find an informal letter, a series of related documents, or a memorandum 
signed by one party sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.180 A 
176. There are limits to what can be included in the works-for-hire category, as this is still a 
matter of law and will be decided using agency principles. For example, musical compositions 
created at home by a chemistry professor, and having no relation to any subjects of the professor’s 
research or teaching would probably not be considered within the professor’s scope of employment 
regardless of broad contractual provisions. Materials relating to a faculty member’s teaching or 
research topics, however, can plausibly be included within the scope of employment and some have 
argued that such material already falls within that scope. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
177. See supra Part II.B. 
178. There is some debate as to whether an exclusive license is equivalent to transfer of 
ownership. See ABRAMS, supra note 122, § 4:44. Analysis of this question is beyond the scope of 
the present Comment, however the issue could be avoided by retention for the university of some 
rights. The right to internal use for educational purposes, for example, is commonly mentioned in 
university copyright policies as being retained by the university and may not be objectionable to 
faculty members. 
179. See MELVIN F. JAGER, LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK § 8:7 (2012). 
180. Id. 
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university copyright policy that purports to transfer ownership cannot be 
enforced under the doctrine of estoppel, as discussed previously,181 but a 
policy that states the university’s intent to license works could be 
enforced under estoppel in the event of a future dispute. As 
works-for-hire, the faculty works being licensed would not be subject to 
termination rights, further protecting faculty members’ rights in the 
event of a future change in university policy.182 An additional advantage 
of licensing is that it allows the parties to divide the rights according to 
their respective interests. Many current university policies seek to retain 
the right to use the works internally, even when they attempt to transfer 
ownership to the faculty member.183 Under a license, the university 
could easily retain the rights that it values most, while granting to the 
faculty members the rights that are of most importance to them. 
C. The Rights Granted in a License Can Be Customized for Different 
Types of Works 
Under current university policies, works are divided into only two 
buckets: those the university will own and those the faculty member will 
own.184 Determining which category a given work fits within becomes a 
high-stakes decision, as one party gets all the rights and the other gets 
nothing.185 Licensing could decrease the controversy around 
categorizing works by allowing the creation of more buckets. 
Universities can create a full set of categories that distribute the rights 
between the university and the faculty member in ways that make sense 
for a variety of works. For example, the university could retain full 
rights in an administrative proposal, grant some rights to the faculty 
member for distance learning curricula, grant more or different rights to 
the faculty member for teaching materials, and grant all rights to the 
faculty member for textbooks. By providing a variety of options, 
181. See supra Part III.C. 
182. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2006). 
183. See, e.g., Northwestern Univ., Copyright Policy § A.1.b (Sept. 1, 2006), available at 
http://invo.northwestern.edu/policies/copyright-policy (“[T]he Creator shall grant, or use best efforts 
to cause others to grant, to the University a perpetual, royalty-free right and license to use, perform, 
display, copy, or reproduce such works, for all traditional, customary or reasonable academic or 
research purposes of the University.”); Kan. Bd. of Regents, Policy and Procedures Manual II.D. 
§ 8(a)(2) (rev. Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://www.kansasregents.org/resources/PDF/2582-
BoardPolicyManual.pdf (“Except for textbooks, institutions shall have royalty-free use of the 
[scholarly] work within the institution, unless otherwise agreed in writing.”). 
184. See supra Part III.E. 
185. See supra Part III.E. 
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universities and faculty should be able to reach an agreement on rights in 
a specific work that addresses the interests of both parties. Additionally, 
providing a variety of licensing options could allow universities to 
permit some kinds of outside work that may currently be prohibited due 
to an inability to agree on copyright ownership of the works involved. 
Providing a variety of licensing options would create a system that is 
flexible enough to adapt to the specific copyright needs of faculty 
members and universities in a wide variety of circumstances. 
D. Publishers Should Accept Licenses from Faculty 
It is common practice for publishers of scholarly works to require that 
faculty authors assign their copyrights to the publisher.186 If many of 
these works were in fact works-for-hire, then the copyrights are held by 
the university, making these assignments ineffective.187 Rather than 
requiring an assignment of rights, however, publishers can accept 
licenses to the copyrights, as is done in the non-academic publishing 
industry.188 If the university grants a license to the faculty member 
which permits sub-licensing, the faculty member is then free to sub-
license his or her rights to a publisher.189 If exclusivity is important to 
the publisher, the faculty member can grant an exclusive sub-license. If 
the publisher wants to be able to sell its rights in the work, the faculty 
member can grant a transferrable license. As the faculty member can 
only sub-license the rights that have been licensed to him or her,190 it 
will be important to ensure that the faculty member is granted 
appropriate rights for works intended for publication. As long as this 
factor is taken into account, it is difficult to imagine a situation that 
could not be addressed satisfactorily by licensing the appropriate rights. 
E. Attribution Provisions Can Ensure that Faculty Members Receive 
Credit for Their Works 
Faculty members may be concerned about receiving appropriate 
credit for their scholarly writings when they do not own the copyrights 
in the works. It is likely to the benefit of both the university and the 
186. See Centivany, supra note 8, at 379 (discussing academic publishing practices). 
187. See supra Part III.B. 
188. See ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING 
AND THE ARTS § 5:13 (3d ed. 2013).  
189. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 9:25 (2012). 
190. Id. 
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faculty member to have the faculty member’s name associated with the 
work.191 Toward that end, the university should adopt an attribution 
policy that requires any use of the work by the university to include 
creative attribution. Faculty members can also include an attribution 
provision in any sub-licenses that they grant to publishers or other third 
parties. This will ensure that the faculty author is credited for his or her 
contributions to the field, even though he or she is not the legal author of 
a work-for-hire. One simple solution for attribution would be to include 
the faculty member’s name on the same line as the copyright notice. For 
example, the copyright notice appearing on the title page of a scholarly 
article could read: “Created by Professor John Doe, © 2013 University 
of Anystate.” In this manner, the correct copyright information is given 
and, at the same time, creative attribution is clear and easy to locate. 
For works already published that list a faculty member as the 
copyright holder, the fact that the actual copyright holder may be the 
university does not invalidate the copyright. The Copyright Act allows 
copyright holders to provide notice to potential infringers that a work is 
copyrighted by marking the work with a symbol and a name.192 Under 
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, a copyright is still 
valid even if the work carries no copyright notice.193 Nimmer notes that 
even when notice was required, giving notice under the wrong name did 
not necessarily make the notice ineffective.194 Mistakenly listing the 
faculty member’s name in the copyright notice, therefore, should be 
legally effective and not jeopardize the copyright in the work. 
CONCLUSION 
Current trends in copyright law leave the ownership of faculty-created 
works ambiguous at best. It is possible that even the copyrights in 
traditional scholarly works created by faculty members belong to their 
respective universities as works-for-hire. This ambiguity results in legal 
uncertainties about ownership and duration of copyrights that could 
impact universities, faculty members, and assignees or licensees of these 
rights. 
191. See Scully, supra note 1, at 252–53 (discussing the benefits of faculty publication to the 
university and to the faculty member). 
192. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). 
193. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) to state that notice “may” be provided rather than “shall” be 
provided). 
194. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 122, § 7.09; see also 17 U.S.C. § 406. 
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In order to resolve these ambiguities, this Comment argues that 
universities and faculty members should agree that the copyrights in 
faculty works belong to the university, as an employer. The university 
should then provide faculty members with an exclusive license to the 
copyrights in the works that they create. This strategy would clarify 
ownership, ensure that licenses provided to publishers and other third 
parties are enforceable, and allow universities and faculty members to 
divide the rights in ways that make sense for a variety of different types 
of works. Although the university would own the copyrights, attribution 
provisions and copyright notices can ensure that faculty members 
receive appropriate recognition for their work. 
Such a dramatic change in universities’ approach to copyrights would, 
no doubt, be controversial. It is important, however, to focus on the 
substantive result of any system for distributing copyrights. The current 
approach, based on vague and potentially unenforceable university 
policies, provides a formalistic affirmation of faculty ownership of 
scholarly works, but paradoxically creates a risk that faculty members 
will have no rights in their scholarly works. A licensing scheme, 
however, could provide greater clarity, enforceability, and control for 
faculty members, thus better serving the parties’ substantive goals. 
 
 
